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Transfer ruleThe expanding literature on ﬁscal decentralization (FD) emphasizes the role of institutional mechanisms for FD's
welfare effects. We analyze the welfare effects of FD in case of a ﬁscal transfer mechanism that punishes inefﬁ-
ciency in tax collection and compensates for local income deﬁciency. In addition, a portion of transfers is
earmarked for investment. Given a level of FD and these rules, the representative local government chooses its
tax collection effort to maximize local utility. The solution of the model reveals that the stricter the redistributive
rule, the higher are steady-state ﬁscal efﬁciency andwelfare.While the effectiveness of the redistributive param-
eters increases with centralization of the revenue pool, it decreases with the tax rate. Both welfare and income
distribution, on the other hand, improvewith the degree of revenue centralization and the tax rate. Besides, ﬁscal
efﬁciency and redistribution decrease with investment-earmarked transfers.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1 Neyapti (2013) provides empirical evidence for the signiﬁcant impact ofﬁscal rules on
the effectiveness of FD.
2 Although developing countries have greater vertical gaps than developed countries on1. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization (FD), deﬁned as the devolution of ﬁscal
power and responsibilities from the central government toward local
governments, has been in practice by varying degrees in a growing
number of countries. As a mechanism theorized to promote ﬁscal efﬁ-
ciency, FD is considered to contribute to social welfare. Following the
seminal work of Oates (1972), the literature has discussed the potential
advantages and disadvantages of FD widely; the consensus emerging
from this literature is that the effectiveness of FD depends on various re-
lated institutional and structural factors (see, for example, Oates, 1999;
Tanzi, 2000; De Mello, 2000; Bouton et al., 2008; and Neyapti, 2004,
2006, 2010). Among the growing number of studies that investigate
the effects of FD, those that are of particular interest for the current
study focus mainly on the growth implications of FD, and show mixed
evidence at that (see, for example, Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Lin and
Liu, 2000; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006; Thiessen, 2003). More
recently, a number of studies focus on the welfare implications of FD
and emphasize the signiﬁcance of the various attributes of redistributive
mechanisms for effective implementation of FD (see, for example,
Sanguinetti and Tomassi, 2004; Stowhase and Traxler, 2005; Akin
et al., 2010).port provided by the Scientiﬁc
#109K122). We also thank to
EAI conference in San Diego.
ti), zbulut@bilkent.edu.trThe current paper contributes to this literature by providing a formal
analysis of the welfare implications of a ﬁscal institutional mechanism
deﬁned by a redistributive rule, an investment rule, and FD. By doing
this, we address three crucial aspects of ﬁscal institutional design that
complement each other and are considered increasingly in the recent
policy reform agendas.1
In viewof the large vertical andhorizontal gaps in both less developed
and developed countries,2 redistribution remains to be a key issue of ﬁs-
cal policy and redistributive rules are therefore an important aspect of in-
stitutional design.3 Favorable macroeconomic effects of ﬁscal rules have
recently been discussed by Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) and by the IMF
(2009). In a theoretical paper, Sanguinetti and Tomassi (2004) demon-
strate that a redistributive rule is preferred to discretion for local govern-
ments to attainﬁscal efﬁciency.4 In a recent study, Akin et al. (2010; ABCN
henceforth) investigate the effectiveness of FD considering a transfer
mechanism that both punishes inefﬁciency in tax collection and compen-
sates for the deviation from target income levels.5 The authors show that,
under such a redistributive rule, FD increases ﬁscal efﬁciency providedaverage, even in developed countries that are federal states, such as Canada, Switzerland,
US and Germany, central government transfers constitute 50% to 70% of local budgets.
3 Boadway and Shah (2007) provide an extensive account of the issues regarding the
design of intergovernmental transfers, stressing the importance of assessing local expen-
diture needs and revenue capacities.
4 The authors argue that discretionary redistribution provides insurance against large
local shocks, but is not preferable under high degree of FD.
5 Ma (1997) points out that among the transfer systems observed in practice, those that
take into account both revenue capacities and expenditure needs are themost developed,
although also the most demanding, ones.
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cal rules enhance the ﬁscal disciplinary effects of FD. These ﬁndings are
relevant not only for ﬁscal institutional design in given economy but
also for an economic union, for which an exemplary case is the recent
economic crises in the EU where ﬁscal decentralization is not accompa-
nied by well-enforced ﬁscal rules.6
Welfare implications of FD have been investigated in several recent
theoretical studies. Lockwood (2002, 2008) employs political economy
models to show that the decentralization theorem7 fails under fairly
unrestrictive conditions. Bataglini et al. (2010) propose a dynamic behav-
ioral model to investigate the extent of the free-riding problem, where
the central versus decentralized decisionmaking is analyzed with regard
to the investment and consumption choices. The authors conclude that
the mechanism characterized by the central government decision on
investment and redistribution is superior to the decentralized decision
in terms of the steady state levels of investment and the public good.
The results are supported by an experimental analysis and shed light on
the dynamic aspects of public good provision. Chu and Yang (2012)
investigate the growth and welfare implications of FD, vis a vis ﬁscal
centralization (FC, under which externalities are internalized and ﬁscal
activity is coordinated), with a focus on tax competition and tax coordi-
nation, and allowing for varying degrees of capital mobility. The authors
argue that centralization generates more welfare than FD when public
good spillovers are above some threshold level; if not, the degree of cap-
ital mobility (tax competition) matters for welfare comparison although
FD always dominates FC in regard to growth.
The current paper also uses a dynamic framework, but departs
from the foregoing studies in that it investigates the welfare effects
of an ABCN-type redistributive rule that takes both efﬁciency and eq-
uity criteria into account. Additionally, it considers that a pre-
determined part of transfers is centrally directed to local capital ac-
cumulation, a feature that conforms to both Battaglini et al.'s ﬁndings
and Chu and Yang's conjecture in that centralization of some aspects
of the ﬁscal regime enhances the welfare effects of FD.8 Given this in-
stitutional setup, local governments choose their tax-collection ef-
forts (A) to maximize their lifetime utility. The cost of increasing A
is the loss of utility due to reduced local disposable incomes; where-
as the gain is the increased transfers, a pre-determined part of which
is directed toward capital accumulation. Localities are differentiated
by their initial capital. General budget deﬁcits are not allowed since
ABCN identiﬁes this as a condition for FD to lead to ﬁscal efﬁciency.
The issues of tax competition and factor mobility that are commonly
investigated in the ﬁscal federalism literature are ignored in the cur-
rent model due to a high level of complexity they would add to the
model.9
We solve the local government's optimization problem for the
steady state, subject to the redistribution rule. Given to the complicacy
of the comparative statics expressions, we perform simulations across
all the feasible ranges of the model's parameters. The analysis reveals
several novel ﬁndings. First and foremost, the main elements of the re-
distributive rule proposed here, namely the rate of punishment of ﬁscal
inefﬁciency and income compensation, are both observed to be effective
instruments not only for improving the level of ﬁscal efﬁciency, but also
for increasing long-term welfare. Second, while centralizing revenues6 A ﬁscal union for the EU members has been discussed since the 1970Werner Report.
7 The theorem, due to Oates (1972) states that decentralizing tax collection and public
good provision is welfare-enhancing especially when regions are heterogeneous and the
spillovers are small.
8 Petchey andMacDonald (2007) analyze the effects of conditional grants for capital ac-
cumulation in South Africa.
9 Lack of coordination between the central and local governments under FD is common-
ly argued to lead to tax competition and underprovision of the public good.Wilson (1999)
argues that in case regions fail to internalize their externalities fully, a corrective subsidy
system improves efﬁciency, similar to the role our transfer rule plays in the currentmodel.
Chu and Yang (2012) also suggests combining FDwith a central coordination device ofﬁs-
cal authority.increasesﬁscal efﬁciency, increasing the tax rate reduces it, as in the fall-
ing part of the tax-Laffer curve.10 Third, the rate of investment-ended
transfers is, interestingly, associated negativelywith tax collection effort
and transfers. Finally, while income distribution improves with the per-
vasiveness of the central government (increasing in both centralization
and tax rates); welfare decreases with it. These observations indicate
that an ideal ﬁscal institutional design does not necessitate ﬁscal decen-
tralization to improve either welfare or income distribution, both of
which may as well improve with a well designed ﬁscal rule instead.
While stringent and well-enforced ﬁscal rules increase efﬁciency, de-
centralization, increasing taxes and investment-ended transfers may
lead to efﬁciency losses. It should be noted, however, that since this
paper refrains from spillover effects across regions due to increased
complexity of analysis, some of the ﬁndings may be modiﬁed in case
they are taken into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 discusses the comparative statistics and reports the re-
sults of the simulation analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
We consider a representative local government i (i = 1…n) that
maximizes its lifetime total utility derived from the spending of the
local private (Ci) and government sectors (Gi) by choosing the level of
efﬁciency in tax collection: Ai:
Max
Ai
X∞
t¼0
ρt α lnCi;t þ β lnGi;t
 
ð1Þ
where ρ is the discount factor, which is assumed to be constant across
the n local governments.α and β represent the utilityweights of the pri-
vate and government spending that are given by:
Ci;t ¼ 1−tið Þyi;t ;where ti ¼ t:Ai ð2Þ
Gi;t ¼ 1−cð Þtiyi;t þ γTRi ;t ð3Þ
where yi stands for (per capita) income in the ith locality. ti is the effec-
tive tax rate for local government i; t is the tax rate and Ai is the tax col-
lection effort (where 0 ≤ Ait ≤ 1). Private consumption is equal to the
after-tax income, and there are no private savings. c stands for the
share of tax revenues accruing to the central government; hence (1− c)
represents the degree of ﬁscal (revenue, to be speciﬁc) decentralization,
which is assumed to be given exogenously.11 Given t, which is determined
centrally and is assumed to be uniform across localities, Eq. (3) stands for
the budget constraint of local government i. The termγTR in Eq. (3) implies
that γ portion of transfers is declared centrally to be used as part of
the local governments' current spending.12 The remaining transfers,
(1− γ)TR, are invested locally, by the local governments. Hence, the
level of investment in region i is given by: Ii,t=(1− γ)TRi,t. Note that
total local spending for locality i (Ci,t+ Gi,t+ Ii,t) is equal to the portion
of after-tax income that remains in the locality: (1 − cti)yi,t, plus the
transfers received (TRi,t). Hence, total local spending is not necessarily10 The ﬁnding that centralization is associated with higher efﬁciency is not surprising in
the case of lack of major heterogeneity, which only takes the form of income differentials
in the current model.
11 Onemay consider that both central and local governments collect the revenues from a
locality where the shares of each are c and (1− c), which would be equivalent to the cur-
rent setupwith the additional assumption thatAi's are identical under the two regimes. Al-
ternatively, Aslim and Neyapti (2013) presents of politico-economic model where c is
determined endogenously.
12 This type of transfers, where the end use is pre-determined when transfers are dis-
bursed, is referred to as directed- or closed-ended budget transfers.
15 The solution code is too long to report here, but is available from the author upon
request.
16 We use the fsolve function in Matlab that yields approximate solutions for k.
17 Because the second root ofA yields no solution for the comparative statics, we use the
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positive or negative.13
A representative local government faces a pre-determined rule that
redistributes the central pool of revenues (TRt = Σi cti yi,t) by both
punishing the inefﬁciency in tax collection and compensating for the
deviation from the target income level (yi⁎)14:
TRi;t ¼ p t yi;t Ai;t−1
 
þm yi;t−yi;t
 
: ð4Þ
The rate of punishment for inefﬁciency in tax collection (that is
when (1− Ai) N 0) is p, and the rate of compensation of the deviation
of income from its target level ism. Assuming that there is no lack of in-
formation or informational asymmetry across the levels of the govern-
ment, the ﬁrst part of Eq. (4) implies that a locality that is not fully
effective in tax collections (Ai b 1) receives less transfers than is implied
by the second part of the expression. The production function is of
Cobb–Douglass type (Eq. (5)) and exhibits constant returns to scale,
where technology is assumed to be ﬁxed (and normalized to 1). The
capital stock follows the usual accumulation rule, where capital accu-
mulation occurs only through investment-ended transfers from central
to local governments (Eq. (6)):
yi;t ¼ kθi;t where 0bθb1ð Þ ð5Þ
ki;t ¼ 1−δð Þki;t−1 þ 1−γð ÞTRi;t−1 ¼ 1−δð Þki;t−1 þ Ii;t−1 ð6Þ
where δ is the rate of depreciation (0 b δ b 1) and k is the per capita level
of capital. In brief, local governments maximize (1) subject to (4) and
(6), given Eqs. (2), (3) and (5). After substituting Eq. (5) into Eqs. (2)
and (3); Eq. (4) into Eqs. (3) and (6), and then Eqs. (2) and (3) into
Eq. (1), the local government problem can be written as:
Max
Ai
X∞
t¼0
ρt α ln 1‐tið Þkθit
h i
þ β ln 1‐cð Þtikθit þ γptkθit Ait−1ð Þ þ γm yit−kθit
 h i 
ð1′Þ
subject to
kit ¼ 1−δð Þkit−1 þ 1−γð Þ ptkθit Ait−1ð Þ þm yit−yit
 h i
: ð6′Þ
The solution of the above problem yields the following ﬁrst order
condition (see Appendix 1.a):
ρt −αtk
θ
it
Cit
þ β
Git
1−cð Þtkθit þ γptkθit
 " #
−λtþ
ρtþ1
α
Ciþ1
θkθ−1itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
−tAitþ1θk
θ−1
itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
 
þ
β
Gitþ1
1−cð ÞtAitþ1θkθ−1itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
þ γptθkθ−1itþ1 Aitþ1−1
  ∂kitþ1
∂Ait
−γmθkθ−1itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
 
2
664
3
775¼ 0
ð7Þ
Ait≤1 ; λt≥0 ; λt 1−Aitð Þ ¼ 0 ð8Þ
where λt is the value of Lagrange multiplier at time t. The second order
conditions of the maximization problem are also satisﬁed (see
Appendix 1.b). Based on the complementary slackness condition,
there are two cases arising, the ﬁrst one being Ait b 1 (and λt = 0) and
the other is the full effort case (Ait = 1). We consider the ﬁrst case to
be the interesting one, although the latter case is also reviewed in the
Appendix 1.13 For the aggregate, however,∑
n
i¼1
TRi ¼∑
n
i¼1
ctiyi for all t.
14 as has been formulated originally by ABCN.Deﬁning the steady state by the constant levels of optimal capital
and income (k and y), we obtain the optimal solution of Ai (for the
case Ait b 1) for the steady-sate using the Matlab program.15 The solu-
tion involves two distinct roots; accordingly, the steady-state values of
the rest of the variables (k, Y, TR, U) are calibrated using each of these
roots. Assuming a target rate of -percent annual increase for each
local income level (yit⁎ = (1 + η)kit − 1θ ), the steady state levels of in-
come, transfers and utility are given by:
TR ¼ kθ pt A−1
 
þ ηm
h i
ð9Þ
y ¼ kθ ð10Þ
U ¼ α ln 1‐tA
 
kθ
 
þ β ln 1‐cð ÞtAþ γpt A−1
 
þ ηγm
h i
kθ
 
: ð11Þ
Using the capital accumulation rule for the steady state: ki,t =
(1 − δ) ki,t − 1 + (1 − γ)TRi,t − 1, Eqs. (9) and (10), and the two
roots of A yield no explicit solution for k. We therefore resort to
the simulation analysis using the admissibility conditions, which
bound the values of the redistributive parameters (p and m), as
well as the degree of revenue decentralization, with the interval
between 0 and 1.16 We consider that the only source of heteroge-
neity across the regions is their initial capital stocks.
The dynamics of themodel can be summarized as follows. Given the
transfer rule (Eq. (4)), the values of Cit and Git (Eqs. (2) and (3)) are de-
termined based on the optimal choices of Ait and its past value Ai,t − 1;
the ﬁrst being through the contemporaneous tax collection (ti) and
the latter is via the past period's transfers that affect ki,t − 1, and hence
ki,t and yi,t through Eq. (6). The next section reports the ﬁndings from
the comparative statics of the optimal steady-state solutions of Ai, TRi,
ki, yi and Ui.
3. Simulation results/ımplications
In this section, we examine the effects of themain parameters of the
proposed transfer mechanism: p,m and γ; the rest of the ﬁscal param-
eters: c and t; and the structural parameter θ, on the steady-state levels
of tax collection effort,17 transfers and utility. Because the partial deriv-
atives of the steady-state expressions (given in the previous section)
with respect to the underlying model parameters are highly nonlinear
and do not yield explicit solutions, comparative statics are obtained
via simulation analysis. Table 1 reports the parameter values that are
used to simulate the model. The utility shares of the private and public
spending: α and β respectively, are approximated by the relative sizes
of private and public sectors, the world average for the latter or which
being 30%.18 The rates of depreciation, δ,19 and discount, ρ, follow the
standard literature.
As Table 1 shows, simulations exhaust all the possible ranges of the
model-speciﬁc parameter values, called admissibility constraints. The
differential initial capital levels are the source of heterogeneity across
the local governments so as to ensure that some redistribution is real-
ized. For tractability, the analysis is conducted for two localities, for
which the initial levels of (per capita) capital are taken as 1 and 4,ﬁrst root in the rest of the simulation analysis.
18 based on International Financial Statistics database of the World Bank.
19 Nadiri and Prucha (1996) shows that the depreciation rate for physical capital is 0.06
and for R&D is 0.12 for the US manufacturing sector.
Table 2
Comparative statics: (for 0 ≤ p,m, γ, c, t ≤1 and 0.1 ≤ θ ≤0.5).
p m (1 − γ)a c t
A + + − + −
U + + na − −
TR − + − na na
Note: “na” indicates ambiguity in the relationship.
a The portion of transfers earmarked for local investment spending.
21 This result may not hold when a consumer optimization problem is added to the cur-
rent framework, which is beyond the scope of the current paper however.
22 The generality of this result, however,may be questioned on the grounds that the cur-
rent model assumes away heterogeneity in preferences.
23 Neyapti (2013) shows that the effectiveness of FD increases with ﬁscal rules. As better
ﬁscal rules (FR)may be implemented inmore decentralized countries, the ﬁndings of this
paper suggest that the same quality of FR may perform better the more centralized is the
ﬁscal policy,
24 The ﬁnding that decentralization leads to greater equality than the case of centraliza-
Table 1
Parameters of the model.
Structural parameters:
δ 0.1 Depreciation rate
ρ 0.95 Discount factor
α 0.7 Utility share of private consumption
β 0.3 Utility share of public consumption
ɳ 0.1 Targeted increase in local income
Admissibility constraints:
m [0, 1] Income compensation parameter
p [0, 1] Punishment rate for inefﬁciency in tax collection
γ [0, 1] The rate investment-ended transfers
c [0, 1] Degree of revenue decentralization
t [0, 1] Tax rate
θ [0, 0.5] Income share of capitala
a Mankiw et al. (1992) show that θ = 1/3 for the case of the US, which is within the
broad range assumed here.
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The following general government budget constraint applies:
TRt ¼ TR1;t þ TR2;t
 
≤ct A y1;t þ y2;t
  
; ð12Þ
which states that total transfers cannot exceed total tax revenues of the
central government; hence an individual locality may receive positive
or negative transfers. The left side of the inequality also satisﬁes Eq. (4).
Simulations of the steady state solutions yield in 6285data points that
meet the admissibility constraints.20 Based on these data, the responses
of the optimal steady state values {Ai; TRi; ki; yi; Ui} to the ﬁscal param-
eters {p,m, γ, c, t} are analyzed and are reported in the following table:
A crucial ﬁnding reported in Table 2 is that increasing both the pun-
ishment rate, p, and the income compensation rate, m, increases the
steady-state level of ﬁscal effort, or the tax collection efﬁciency, unam-
biguously. This observation supports the efﬁciency enhancing effect of
the suggested redistributive rule. The positive effect of p is as expected,
and that of m appears counterintuitive at ﬁrst but can be explained as
follows. When the income compensation rate is high, the steady-state
level of transfers is also high, which gives incentive to the local govern-
ments to increase their effort to get a larger share of the increasing pool.
This can be interpreted as the substitution effect of the income-
compensation parameter.
Result 1. The parameters of the suggested redistribution rule all have an
unambiguous positive effect on ﬁscal efﬁciency: (∂ A/∂p N 0; ∂ A/∂m N 0;
and ∂ A/∂(1− γ) N0) (see Appendix 2).
The positive effects of the redistributive parameters on efﬁciency (total
effort of the two regions) are diminishing in the respective parameters, al-
though they increase in the degree of centralization, c. This points at the
signiﬁcant role of ﬁscal rules in alleviating the public good problem; in
the presence of a ﬁscal rule, increased common pool of revenues incentiv-
ize local governments to increase their efﬁciency in order to obtain a great-
er share of that commonpool. By contrast, the efﬁciency effects of theﬁscal
rule parameters decreasewith the tax rate as the local governments try to
counterbalance the negative effect of increasing the tax rate on local
disposable incomes and thus utility derived from private consumption.
Remark 1. The more centralized the ﬁscal revenues, the more effective
is the proposed ﬁscal rule in increasing ﬁscal efﬁciency.
Besides its indirect (second order) effects on ﬁscal efﬁciency, the tax
rate also has a direct negative effect on the tax collection effort, for the
reason just explained. This negative relationship increases in c, but
decreases in t; the reason for the ﬁrst is that as the centralized pool of20 The number increases with the reduced intervals chosen for the parameter values in
the simulation. Admissibility criteria consist, in addition to the parameter constraints
listed in Table 1, of the non-negativity of capital, consumption and government spending,
in addition to (0,1) bound for the tax collection effort.revenues increases, ceteris paribus, reducing ﬁscal effort compensates
for the negative effect of increasing taxes on local incomes without
reducing the level of transfers that may now be received in through
income compensation given the hard budget constraint (Eq. (12)).
The observation of the diminishing negative effect of the tax rate on
tax collection effort points at the decreasing role of income compensa-
tion in overcoming the increase in the disutility from punishment due
to the reduction in the effort in tax collection; tax effort therefore falls
at a decreasing rate as the tax rate rises.
Result 2. The negative effect of taxes on ﬁscal efﬁciency increases with
the centralization of revenues but decreases in the tax rate. (see
Appendix 3).
The rate at which transfers are earmarked for investment (1− γ) has
a negative effect on both tax collection effort and transfers.21 While the
reason for thismay not be obvious, it reﬂects the long-termpositive effect
of increasing investment, ceteris paribus, on income (remember that in-
vestment ended transfers is the only way for capital accumulation),
which in turn allows for lower steady-state effort to attain the same
level of utility,which can be viewed as thewealth effect.22 Since local gov-
ernments receive utility both from their own (current and investment)
spending and from the private sector spending, an increase in the long-
term capital stock and thus disposable income of the private sector, local
governments can afford to exert lower tax effort to attain the same level
of utility as before. The sameargument canbeused to explain thenegative
effect of the initial capital level on the steady-state level of tax effort.
Result 3. Investment-ended transfers are associatedwith long-term ef-
ﬁciency in tax collection (see Appendix 4).
A testable implication arising from the above results is that ﬁscal
rules are likely to be more effective in countries that centralize ﬁscal
revenues.23 Given a level of decentralization and ﬁscal rule, increasing
the rates of tax and investment-ended transfers, however, may not con-
tribute to efﬁciency.
Another important implication of the redistributivemechanism stud-
ied is in regard to incomedistribution (measuredhere asY1 / Y2). Fairness
in income distribution increases in the punishment rate; with regard to
the rate pervasiveness (rates of taxes and their centralization), however,
the relationship is negative.24 Similarly, welfare (sum of regional utili-
ties) decreases in the pervasiveness of the central government. In addi-
tion, income distribution is observed to worsen in θ. This is because the
volume of transfers arising from punishment also increases in θ, which
is the moral hazard effect of increased income. It is worth noting thattion (compare Block 1 to Column 3) is inconsistent with theﬁnding of ABCN (2011); using
the same transfer rule in a static set-up, ABCN shows that centralization leads to higher
equalitywhereas decentralization leads to greater efﬁciency than the other. The difference
in the ﬁndings points at the importance of taking the long-term perspective in designing
institutions to achieve ﬁscal efﬁciency.
Table 3
A sample of steady states.
p m c t γ θ A Y U
i 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.47 0.2256 −5.80
ii 1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.90 0.2256 −7.03
iii 1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.1 1.08 0.2256 −6.87
iv 1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.86 0.2256 −7.33
v 1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.90 0.0029 −15.77
vi 1 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.79 0.2256 −7.27
vii 1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.3 1.23 0.0029 −15.31
viii 1 0.2 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.3 1.97 0.0029 −15.74
ix 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.14 0.0000 −24.64
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steady state values of the model variables are associated with the rate of
punishment of only 1.
Remark 2. The less pervasive the central government, the greater the
welfare and the distributional effects of the proposed redistributive
rule (see Appendix 5).
Remark 3. Under the proposed redistributive rule, conditions for im-
proving welfare and income distribution are the same, whereas they
are opposite of those for efﬁciency: increasing tax rate reduces both ﬁscal
efﬁciency andwelfare andworsens income distribution. FD, on the other
hand reduces efﬁciency but improves welfare and income distribution.
Simulations also reveal that transfers fall in the degree at which
transfers are directed to investments (1− γ). Transfers also decrease
in p but increase inm, as consistentwith the redistributive rule (Eq. (4)).
3.1. Some policy exercises
Table 3 reports the simulated values of the aggregate (summed across
the regions) tax-collection effort; income and welfare corresponding to
some benchmark parameter values. To get a better sense of these param-
eters one can note that the average tax rate is at most 0.5 or 0.6 in the
most developed countries, and much less in developing countries (such
as 0.2 in Mexico). The rate of revenue decentralization in even the most
decentralized developed countries, say in Switzerland, is less than 0.5.25
Hence, a pervasive central government amounts to either highly central-
ized revenue collection, with or without a high average tax rate, or high
average tax rate plus reasonably high revenuedecentralization. In that re-
gard, Denmark's (where c=0.3, t=0.5) central government is not per-
vasive, whereas China's is (where c= 0.95).
In Table 3, the calibration results for A, Y and U are the sum over the
two regions. Hence, one can interpret the Table as the following. Line i,
representing relatively low c and t values, may stand for a country like
Mexico in case it applies a full measure of the proposed redistributive
rule (where p = m = 1). This can be contrasted with lines ii and v,
where income compensation is much less in cases of low (ii) and high
(iv) income shares of capital. Of these, highest effort obtains in the
ﬁrst, and lowest welfare in the last case. Line vi may be viewed to
stand for the case of China (with high revenue centralization but low
tax rates), if China adopted high punishment rate but low income com-
pensation. This case, which only differs in cwhen compared to the line
above, yields higher steady-state effort as well as higher welfare.
Comparing lines ii and vi (or lines vii and viii) reveals that increasing
centralization, ceteris paribus, increases ﬁscal efﬁciency but not welfare.
Comparing lines ii to iv shows the effect of increasing the tax rate, which
is negative on both efﬁciency andwelfare. Finally, comparing lines ii and
iii shows that decreasing the portion investment-earmarked transfers
(increasing γ) leads to higher tax effort. These observations are all in
lines with the general results reported earlier.
The foregoing observations enable important policy recommenda-
tions regarding ﬁscal institutional design: the proposed transfer rule
yields higher welfare under decentralization than centralization, al-
though it yields higher ﬁscal efﬁciency under a centralized system
than under decentralization.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper presents a dynamic model to explore the efﬁciency of a
redistributive rule that punishes the lack of tax collection efﬁciency of25 Author's calculation based on the OECD at a Glance, 2011, statistics on ﬁscal revenues
by levels of government. The ﬁgure is obtained by dividing the sum of the state and local
government revenues to the overall government revenues (general, local, state and social
security).local governments and compensates for the deviation of local incomes
from a target level. The redistributive rule is coupled by a policy of di-
rected transfers that allocates an exogenously speciﬁed (by the central
government) portion of the transfers (determined according to the
aforementioned rule) to local capital accumulation.
Theﬁndings based on the comparative statics of themodel's solution
for the steady state reveal that both punishment of ﬁscal inefﬁciency
and compensation of regional income deﬁciency are essential for in-
creasing ﬁscal discipline and welfare. However, while centralization of
revenues improves ﬁscal efﬁciency, it deteriorates both welfare and in-
come distribution. Given the proposed redistributive rule, increasing
the tax rate and investment-ended transfers, especially in cases of high-
ly centralized revenues, donot contribute positively to efﬁciency orwel-
fare. The ﬁndings shed light to the contradiction between the original
arguments of the decentralization literature and the recent literature
that formally demonstrates the failure of the decentralization theorem,
by demonstrating the role of the ﬁscal rules for welfare implications of
ﬁscal decentralization.
The ﬁndings bear interesting implications for ﬁscal discipline in eco-
nomic unions aswell as in a single economywith large vertical and hor-
izontal imbalances that necessitate an effective transfer mechanism. In
the case of the European Union, for example, where, akin to different
local decision making units of a ﬁscally decentralized country, the
union faces a single central bank but independent ﬁscal authorities,
the importance of imposing a ﬁscal rule for redistribution across the
states has become even more evident with the recent crises. As future
potential research areas, the observations based of the proposed
model can be tested empirically. Further extensions could involvemod-
iﬁcations of the current framework to incorporate the political economy
aspects, such as modeling the game between the central and the local
governments, and the optimal choice of FD given the degrees of political
fragmentation and spillover effects, which are among the ongoing pro-
jects of the authors of the current study.Appendix 1. Optimality checks
A1. First order analysis
The constraint qualiﬁcation is obviously satisﬁed since the con-
straints are linear. Also note that objective function is concave. So we
can apply Kuhn Tucker's theorem. The Lagrangean expression is obtain-
ed after substituting Eq. (4) into Eq. (3) and substituting Eqs. (2) and (3)
into Eq. (1):
L ¼
X∞
t¼1
ðα lnðyi;t‐tAi;tyi;tÞ þ β lnð 1‐cð ÞtAi;tyi;t þ γðptyi;tðAi;t−1Þ
þmðyi;t−yi;t ÞÞÞ þ λtð1‐Ai;tÞ

:
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tions:with respect to Ai,t:
ρt −αtk
θ
it
Cit
þ β
Git
1−cð Þtkθit þ γptkθit
  !
−λtþ
ρtþ1
α
Ciþ1
θkθ−1itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
−tAitþ1θk
θ−1
itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
 
þ
β
Gitþ1
1−cð ÞtAitþ1θkθ−1itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
þ γptθkθ−1itþ1 Aitþ1−1
  ∂kitþ1
∂Ait
−γmθkθ−1itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
 
2
664
3
775¼ 0
with respect to λt: Ai,t ≤ 1 , λt ≥ 0, λt(1− Ai,t) = 0.
Since ki,t+ 1= (1− δ) ki,t+(1− γ)TRi,t=(1− δ) ki,t+(1−γ)(ptYi,
t(Ai,t− 1) +m(Yi,t⁎− Yi,t)), we get:
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
¼ 1−γð Þptkθi;t : ð17Þ
Case 1. If λt = 0, then Ai,t b 1 (given the constraint Ai,t ≤ 1 in Eq. (8))
Substituting (2), (3), (4) and Eq. (17) into the above Lagrangean function
yields the optimum level of Ai, an explicit solution of which cannot be
reached, however. Instead, Matlab is used to obtain symbolic solutions.26
For capital, which is a function of Ai, no explicit solution can be ob-
tained either. We employ the fsolve function in Matlab, as a nonlinear
approximation for evaluating the steady state values of k.27 Using the
simulated values obtained via this solution method, the steady state
values of transfers, income and utility are also obtained.
Case 2. Taking λt N 0 implies that Ai,t = 1, based on which Eq. (4)
becomes:
TRi;t ¼ m 1þ ηð Þkθi;t−1−kθi;t
 
:
At the steady state, A = 1; and k ¼ η 1−γδ m
  1
1−θ
.
In the full effort case, steady state capital decreases in γ, δ, and θ (be-
cause the term in parentheses is less than one) and increases in m un-
ambiguously. However, it is not plausible to take Case 2 as optimal in
any given period due to the incentives local governments usually face
to spend less than full tax collection effort.
A2. Second order analysis
Because the constraint qualiﬁcation and ﬁrst order condition are sat-
isﬁed, then, in a generic form:
D2L x;λ
  ¼ D2 f xð Þ þXj
i¼1
λiD
2gi xð Þ
wherex is taken as the optimal choice variable, f is the objective function
and j is the number of constraints.
Since the model's inequality constraint is linear, its second order
derivative is zero, that is, the secondpart of the above equationdisappears.
So,
D2L A;λ
 
¼ αtk
θ
it
Cit
2 −tk
θ
it
 
− β
Git
2 1−cð Þtk
θ
it þ γptkθit
 2" #þ
ρ
− α
Ciþ1
2 θk
θ−1
itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
−tAitþ1θk
θ−1
itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
 2
−
β
Gitþ1
2 1−cð ÞtAitþ1θk
θ−1
itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
þ γptθkθ−1itþ1 Aitþ1−1
  ∂kitþ1
∂Ait
−γmθkθ−1itþ1
∂kitþ1
∂Ait
 2
2
6664
3
7775:
Since ∂
2kitþ1
∂2Ait
¼ 0, α N 0, β N 0 and the other terms are in square forms
then D2L A;λ
 
b0 . Hence, the second order condition is satisﬁedunconditionally.
26 The above Lagrangean equation is nonlinear; MATLAB solves for a nonlinear function
if there is a symbolic solution. For this speciﬁc problem, the solution for the optimal tax ef-
fort exists, which is too long to report here (available upon request).
27 The capital accumulation rule yields the steady state value of capital; but since no ex-
plicit can be obtained, it is calculated numerically.Appendix 2. Comparative statics
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